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Many welfare reforms undertaken in OECD-countries are directed towards 
enhancing efficiency in the administration and implementation of social 
security and social benefits. In this perspective the governance reforms in 
The Netherlands are an example of decentralisation through budgeting of 
means to municipalities. This brings about a unique twofold experiment in 
which we compare the efficiency changes in providing social assistance as 
a result of decentralisation and budgeting and the influence of policy 
measures at a local level. By using data envelopment analysis we assess 
the effect of the introduction of the new Work and Social Assistance Act 
(WSA) in 2004 on cost efficiency. By using a stochastic frontier analysis 
we assess the impact of municipal policy strategies on cost inefficiencies 
for the period 2005-2007. We find a clear positive effect of the WSA in 
2004 on cost efficiency. Furthermore, we find that in the aftermath, when 
efficiency slowly dropped after 2005, there is a distinct impact of policy 
strategies municipalities adopt. Pursuing a strategy of activation raised 
efficiency significantly, whereas strict control or combinations of strategies 
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Decentralisation of national government policies to local levels is often 
justified by a need to improve efficiency. It prevents agency problems 
between national and local governments and local governments can better 
adapt policy measures to local needs, priorities and local partnerships 
(OECD, 2004, 1999). These arguments are the basic underlying reasons 
of the Dutch reforms in the administration of welfare and social benefits. 
The 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act (WSA) gives all municipalities 
full responsibility for activating and reintegrating the 340,000 social 
assistance clients they had in 2004. The main thing they cannot influence 
is the benefit level, since these are national standards. An important 
aspect of the WSA is the change in funding of municipalities. Instead of 
claiming all social assistance expenses directly from the central 
government, from 2004 onwards, local governments get a fixed budget to 
cover all social assistance expenses. The idea is that this will lead to a 
more efficient implementation of the welfare case load (Bosselaar et al. 
2008; CPB, 2006). This new governance model creates incentives for 
reducing caseloads since money saved by municipalities, originally 
earmarked for benefits, can be transferred to other expenses. 
Municipalities also have more discretion in choosing measures for 
activating their beneficiaries (Tergeist & Grubb, 2006; Van Berkel, 2006).  
 
But there is another aspect in this matter. Do municipalities actually have 
sufficient influence to prevent welfare dependency and promote outflow to 
the labour market? It is in this case not the question of how things have 
to be done, which is the main question in the public administration 
literature on decentralisation, but what has to been done (Van Berkel et 
al. 2007). The main conclusion in a substantial and growing body of 
evaluation literature on active labour market policy is that there are 
indeed effects of local policy instruments, but the net effects are in fact 
really small (Kluve, 2007; De Koning, 2007). Research on the effects of 
municipal policy measures on the in- and outflow of social assistance in 
the period 2004-2007 confirms the small influence of municipal policy 
(Broersma et al., 2009; Edzes et al., 2009).     
 
So from these two perspectives the reforms of the Dutch welfare system 
gives a unique twofold insight. First, what have been the effects of 
decentralisation on the municipal cost efficiency of social assistance 
benefits? In other words, did the introduction of full budgeting in 2004 of 
the WSA have an effect on municipal cost efficiency of social assistance? It 
adds to the literature that is assessing the impact of public management 
reform, especially at the local levels of government and public services 
(Ter Bogt, 2008; Ridder, 2005). Second, what is the influence of local 
policy strategies on the efficiency? It contributes to the literature that is 
assessing the impact of instruments of active labour market policy (Card 




The first question will be addressed for the period 2001-2007. The second 
question will be addressed for the shorter period 2005-2007. The main 
reason differentiating between two time periods is the fact that municipal 
policy strategies can only adequately be identified for the period 2005-
2007.  
 
In section 2 we first give a brief overview of the developments in the 
Dutch social security arrangements of the past two decades. Section 3 
describes arguments in favour and against the expectations that these 
reforms lead to more efficiency. Section 4 goes into the specifics of 
identifying efficiency scores of municipal social assistance benefit costs. 
We will use two different strategies for this, each corresponding to our two 
sample periods. In the longer period 2001-2007, efficiency itself will be 
assumed to depend only on variables that act as inputs in the municipal 
cost process of social assistance. The annual cost efficiency indicators are 
determined by the distance of each municipal cost process to the efficient 
cost frontier. This frontier is determined in a so-called Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). For the shorter period 2005-2007, cost efficiency is also 
determined by municipal inputs, but it is also linked explicitly to municipal 
policy strategies. This enables application of a Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) to determine the cost frontier. Pros and cons of both methods will 
also be discussed in section 4. Section 5 discusses the data used and 
methodological set-up applied in this paper. Section 6 and 7 shows the 
empirical results and finally section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2. Developments in social assistance 
 
The past decades many OECD-countries made a transformation in their 
welfare states, mostly denoted ‘from passive tot active welfare states’ or 
‘from welfare to workfare’ (Brandt et al. 2005; OECD, 2003, 1999; 
Lødemel, 2000; Van Berkel, 2006). Although countries differ in their 
institutional arrangements, mainly because of different institutional and 
political roots and historical path dependencies, the underlying movement 
is the same everywhere (Brandt et al. 2005; OECD. 2003; Tergeist. 
2006). In the Netherlands, the transformation started in the midst of the 
eighties, but the more fundamental institutional reforms in social security 
and manpower policies took place at the beginning of the nineties and 
comprise two central thoughts, namely activation as an overall strategy 
and privatisation with an emphasis on markets for the implementation 
(Van Gestel et al. 2009). 
 
The Dutch system consists of social insurance benefits for unemployment 
and disability and social assistance benefits. For the social insurance 
benefits employers and employees pay an insurance premium from which 
benefits are paid in case of layoff or disability. Social insurance 
arrangements are nowadays carried out by an independent public 
corporation. Social assistance provides a social minimum income to those 
not (fully) eligible to any of the other arrangements. This type of benefit is 
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financed by the national government. Social assistance is nowadays 
completely decentralised to the municipality in which recipients live. The 
national government distributes fixed funds to municipalities from which 
they pay social assistance benefits.  
 
Figure 1 shows the trend lines over the past 40 years for social insurance 
and social assistance benefits. The number of benefits for disability is by 
far the highest, reaching almost 1 million in 2002. From its outset in 1967, 
disability benefits have been on an increasing pace, particularly after the 
1975 recession. This was caused by the option that partly disabled 
unemployed were entitled to obtain a full disability benefit, instead of a 
(lower) unemployment benefit. Even though this option was abolished in 
1987, the upward trend remained until the first major reform in the early 
1990’s. This reform restricted eligibility and established an independent 
supervisory board. This immediately led to a drop in the number of 
disability benefit recipients. A much more extensive reform in 2002, 
focusing more on participation of disabled, than on mere income support, 
implied an even larger fall. Unemployment insurance benefits form the 
smallest, but most cyclical, social security arrangement. Eligibility depends 
on job duration of employees and this criterion was also tightened in a 
number of reforms. The number of social assistance benefits lies in 
between the other two. The recessions of the early 1980’s caused an 
explosion in the number of social assistance benefits from 200 thousand in 
1980 to 550 thousand in 1985. In fact, social insurance benefits are 
allocated to individuals, whereas a social assistance benefit pertains to the 
household an individual belongs to. When there are other household 
members with an income, this implies only a lower or no social assistance 
benefit will be granted.  
 
Figure 1. Main social security arrangements in The Netherlands: 
social assistance, unemployment insurance and disability, 
1970-2008 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands (own calculation) 
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The social assistance system has also been subject to reform in the past 
15 years. We can split up these reforms into two lines. The first line refers 
to changes in the legal framework. Basically social assistance has evolved 
from a social income support system to a participation and unemployment 
provision (Geuns & Van Gent, 2007; Van Berkel, 2006). In 1996 the New 
Social Assistance Act for example sets a new legal framework in which the 
entitlements for social assistance were coupled to obligatory job search. 
From that point on the central thought is that employment goes before 
income. The role of social assistance changed to that of gate keeping, of 
individual activation contracts and the introduction of Workfirst-practices.  
 
The second line had to do with the administration and implementation of 
social assistance. Basically, deregulation and decentralisation strengthen 
the administrative position of municipalities, which means they are better 
equipped in carrying out the social assistance arrangement. Until 2001 
this arrangement still meant that municipalities could claim the expenses 
they made on behalf of social assistance benefits to the national 
authorities. In case there were more benefit recipients than anticipated, 
municipalities could simply claim the additional costs, in case there were 
less recipients they simply repaid the surplus. The rationale behind this 
was the premise that municipalities had no effect on the occurrence of 
unemployment and hence (in the end) social assistance (IBO, 1996). 
However, this way of financing social assistance implied no incentive for 
municipalities to limit inflow or stimulate outflow of these benefit 
recipients. The reforms in the financing scheme subsequently increase the 
financial responsibility of municipalities. First in 2001 when municipalities 
could claim 75% of the costs of social assistance from the national 
government. The remaining 25% was budgeted to them by the national 
government, based on criteria independent of the number of social benefit 
recipients and basically independent of municipal actions. Second, the 
2004 WSA meant that 100% of the costs of social assistance and 
reintegration measures were budgeted to municipalities, based on socio-
economic variables that take into account the demographic and regional 
labour market situation. Hence, when benefit costs exceed this budget, 
the municipality has to find other resources, which usually means less for 
other municipal measures. On the other hand, less benefit costs than 
budgeted, implies the full amount of this surplus is at the municipality’s 
discretion.  
 
Both legal and administrative reforms are directed towards a shift in social 
assistance from income support to stimulating participation and a shift in 
incentives to municipalities to limit inflow and stimulate outflow of social 
assistance benefits. These reforms finalised an ongoing decentralisation 
process in the execution of the social assistance provision in The 
Netherlands. The drop in social assistance benefits after 1996 and 2004 is 
usually connected to these reforms (see figure 1). Initial research over the 
period 2001-2004 suggests that these reforms increased the overall 
efficiency of the municipalities (CPB, 2006). It has led to less entry into 
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social assistance and more exits out of social assistance. (Ernst, 2008; 
Bosselaar et al. 2007; CPB, 2006). Table 1 shows that the total amount of 
expenditures on social assistance has declined from 4.3 billion in 2002 to 
3.9 billion in 2007. In that same period the total volume of social 
assistance recipients declines from 322 thousand to 274 thousand.   
 
Table 1. Main indicators social assistance provision, 2002-2007 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total amount of 
expenditures social 













Total amount of re-
integration measures  













Total volume of social 
assistance recipients (< 













* Expenditures to recipients under 65 years of age.    
 
From an international perspective the new incentive structure has 
stimulated a substantial decline in social assistance dependency as 
compared to other OECD-countries although the proportion of recipients at 
any moment in time remains high.  
 
Table 2. Shares of social assistance beneficiaries in the OECD   
   (% of population of 15-64) 

















































































































       
Source: Carcillo & Grubb. 2006 
 
The lump sum financing of benefits and reintegration means also renewed 
the role of municipalities in taking up a local labour market policy 
(Broersma et al, 2009; Edzes, 2008). After all, municipalities now have an 
intrinsic interest in preventing inflow and promoting outflow from social 
assistance, alone or together with other municipalities, public or private 




3. Efficiency of reforms in social assistance 
 
There are two main arguments why decentralisation should lead to more 
efficiency. The first reason has its origin in a rational institutionalist way of 
thinking, which is the basis for the new public management or neo-
institutional economics (Ter Bogt, 2008; Scott, 2001; Hall & Taylor, 
1996). Organizations are making rational choices between costs and 
revenues, are well-informed and in pursuit of efficiency. For instance, the 
agency-theory is explicitly used as argument for allocating means to 
municipalities (IBO, 1996). Because of information-asymmetry the 
national government cannot adequately control municipalities so local 
governments can easily shift the costs of social assistance benefits to 
national governments. This dilemma could be overcome by reinforcing the 
financial interest of municipalities for better implementation. In its turn, 
this should lead to more efficiency. Furthermore, this could also stimulate 
policy innovation, because it allows for several simultaneous experiments 
by local governments (Strumpf, 2002). According to this last line of 
reasoning municipalities learn from each other by experimenting with local 
policies and by benchmarking and transferring the results. In the end, this 
would lead to an optimal outcome through an ideal implementation 
scheme that would emerge from a local learning process. 
 
The second reason has its origin among other things in the contingency 
theory of organizations, which assumes that in becoming efficient, 
organizations should adapt to different environments (Donaldson, 2001). 
It is well argued that local governments should be better equipped to 
adapt policy programmes to local needs and circumstances, which should 
make social policies more flexible and more effective (OECD, 2003; 1998). 
In situations where local policy responsibility is accompanied by financial 
responsibility, there is a clear incentive to perform better. Eventually this 
would enhance the efficiency. While both points lead to more efficiency, 
the underlying mechanisms are different.  
 
Theoretically, it is also possible to think of a scenario in which efficiency 
improvements do not take place. In the neo-institutional organizational 
sociology, organizations do not pursue efficiency per se, simply because 
organisations do not always know what is effective, i.e. what is working 
and what is not. This certainly is true for ‘weak technology’ organisations 
such as schools and social welfare organizations. In absence of knowledge 
and information, such organisations accept practices that have legitimacy 
instead of an empirically proven efficiency. That does not mean that 
organisations act irrationally or do not formulate goals and specify ways to 
reach them but ‘.. these beliefs are myths in the sense that they depend 
for their efficacy, for their reality, on the fact that they are widely shared, 
or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted the 
right to determine such matters’ (Scott & Meyer [1983], 1993: 1). In this 
social-constructionist point of view organizations behave according to 
normative and cultural guidelines. The outcome of this behaviour could be 
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that organizations converge “..around short-term behavioural equilibria 
that may be less efficient than rejected alternatives” (DiMaggio, 1998: 
697).  
 
Legitimacy instead of efficiency also plays a role in the political 
institutional point of view which introduces the concept of political conflict 
and path dependency. Here is organizational behaviour the result of 
political conflict which often leads to compromises at the end. This could 
lead organisations to accept goals that differ from the national of 
efficiency one (see for instance: Bredgaard et al. 2003). Furthermore, the 
fact that municipalities are democratically controlled organisations, with 
different political assemblies and priorities could lead to outcomes that are 
less efficient.       
 
So there are arguments for more efficiency as a result of decentralisation, 
but there are also arguments for less efficiency, at least as an explanation 
for differences between municipalities. 
 
 
4. Frontier analysis 
 
When discussing the performance of firms or institutions it is common to 
describe this in terms of productive or cost efficiency. Efficiency is then 
determined by how close the actual production or costs of the firm or 
institution lie to the production or cost frontier. The efficient production 
frontier is determined by two conditions: (i) technical efficiency, i.e. 
minimum use of inputs, and (ii) allocative efficiency, i.e. optimal mix of 
inputs given relative factor prices. If duality between cost and production 
transformation processes is ensured by imposing regularity conditions on 
the production possibilities set, the efficient production frontier can be 
rewritten as an efficient cost frontier.1 
 
The absence of technical or allocative efficiency (or both) necessarily leads 
to a departure from production maximization or cost minimization and 
therefore creates inefficiency. In this paper, we focus on municipal cost 
efficiencies with respect to their social assistance payments. The size of 
this cost efficiency is based on the difference between observed costs and 
predicted minimum costs for a given scale, a mix of relevant outputs and 
factor prices as explanatory variables. In other words, each municipality in 
the sample is benchmarked against the ‘‘best’’ municipality in the sample. 
 
There are several methodologies and techniques to determine the 
efficiency of firms and institutions. Most of them are based on the use of 
simple indicators or on techniques, as e.g. Free Disposable Hull (FDH), 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) or Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). 
Non-parametric approaches to measuring efficiency, such as DEA and FDH 
have the advantage of imposing less structure on the frontier than do 
                                                 
1 These regularity conditions are a non-decreasing function with linear homogeneity and 
concavity in input prices. 
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parametric approaches, such as SFA. On the other hand, their drawback is 
their deterministic nature, i.e. not allowing for random errors caused by 




DEA is an analytical technique that can be used to assist in identifying 
best practice performance in the use of resources amongst a group of 
similar organisations (Decision Making Units – DMU). DEA started off with 
Farell (1957) and became more widespread with the work of Charnes et 
al. (1978). Seiford (1996) provides a review of the developments in DEA 
thereafter. Tools like DEA are useful in situations where government 
bodies operate in markets, which are distorted by regulated prices, 
subsidies and a lack of contestability. In these cases the usual market 
indicators of performance, like profitability and rates of return, cannot be 
used to gauge an institution’s economic performance accurately. In these 
situations DEA provides a comparative monitoring that can identify 
variations in efficiency between organisations and may provide directions 
for performance improvement (cf. Abbott and Doucouliagos, 2003). 
 
A key concept in DEA is the choice of DMUs as the entities responsible for 
converting inputs into outputs. Evidently, the choices of outputs and 
inputs are also important. It is not required, however, that functional 
forms which relate the inputs to the outputs be specified explicitly; it is 
also not required that weights be assigned to any of the inputs or outputs 
to reflect their supposed relative importance on an a priori basis. 
 
In this paper, we apply DEA to explore technical efficiency of municipal 
costs of social assistance in The Netherlands. Technical efficiency means 
that an institution cannot produce more output from its existing inputs. In 
the case of municipalities’ social assistance expenses, this means that the 
technically efficient municipality is not able cut more on social assistance 
costs, given its demographic and socio-economic characteristics. See also 
Charnes et al. (1989) who apply a DEA approach to Chinese cities.  
 
Consider a world in which there are n municipalities, each using m inputs 
to produce s outputs. Denote by xi,j the input i used by the j-th 
municipality, and let yr,j denote the same municipality’s output of type r. 
For each municipality, a linear programming model is solved, which 
chooses vectors of input and output weights so as to maximise efficiency 
(or equivalently minimise inefficiency), subject to relevant constraints. For 
municipality k, the variable returns to scale, input oriented, cost 
minimisation data envelopment problem can be expressed as 
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where wi,k is a vector of input weighs of municipality k, λj is a vector of 
constants (j=1,…,n) and is the cost minimizing vector of input 
quantities of type i in municipality k, both calculated from the above linear 




The total cost efficiency (CE) of the k-th municipality is calculated as 
 
   mi kikimi kiki xwxw 1 ,,1 *,, CE      (2) 
 
It is useful at this stage to provide a more intuitive account of the DEA 
efficiency scores. Consider a problem in which just two inputs are used to 
produce one output. Suppose also that there municipalities labelled A, B 
and C. Let A use a1 units of input 1 and a2 units of input 2 to produce one 
unit of output; let B use b1 units of input 1 and b2 units of input 2 to 
produce the same quantity of output, with b1 > a1 and b2 < a2. Finally 
let the usage of inputs 1 and 2 by C to produce one unit of output be 
denoted by c1 and c2 respectively, such that C is strictly to the right of 
the line segment AB. This is illustrated in figure 1 (cf. Johnes and Johnes, 
1993) 
 
There exist points on a line drawn between A and B in figure 2, which 
dominate C in the following sense: a linear combination of A and B (say 
C*) would allow a given output to be produced using less of each input 
than is employed by C. Therefore C cannot be technically efficient, even if 
the most favourable assumptions are made about the value (or weight) 
attached to each input. The line AB corresponds to the frontier and a 
radial measure of C's technical inefficiency, which corresponds to the 
efficiency score in (2), is the ratio OC*/OC.  
 
For more on DEA, we refer to Abbott and Doucouliagos (2003), Fried et al. 
(2002), Coelli (1996a), Johnes and Johnes (1993), Charnes et al. (1989) 














Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) was developed by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and has further been developed by Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) and 
Coelli (1996b, 1999). Considering a cost function approach, like DEA, SFA 
is also applied to determine the efficiency of institutions (DMUs) that have 
undergone structural reforms and deregulations, such as banks (Maudos 
et al. 2001, Fries and Taci 2005), hospitals (Linna, 1998; Rosko, 2001) 
and utilities (Burns and Weyman-Jones, 1996; Ashton, 2000; Timmins, 
2002; Farsi and Filippini, 2004). In a production function setting, SFA has 
been applied to assess new production methods (Stijn at al. 1999; van der 
Vlist and Folmer, 2009). 
 
As argued, also local governments like municipalities have been subjected 
to structural reforms. This led to efficiency studies on the overall cost level 
of municipal services (vanden Eeckaut et al., 1993; De Borger, 1996) or 
specific privatised services (Pina and Torres, 2001). We will apply the SFA 
approach to determine the cost inefficiency of municipal social assistance 
expenditures. 
 
SFA allows for a model with random errors, as opposed to DEA, which is a 
purely deterministic technique. The SFA assumes these errors to comprise 
(i) inefficiencies, following an asymmetric distribution, usually a truncated 
or half-normal distribution, and (ii) random errors following a symmetric 
distribution, usually the standard normal distribution. The reason for this 
particular structure of the composite error term is that, by definition, 
inefficiencies cannot be negative.  
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The municipalities’ relative efficiency of social assistance expenditures 
using panel data is performed by estimating a cost function of the general 
form 
 
      (3) titititi uvXy ,,
'
,,  
     
where yi.t is the total expenditure on social assistance in municipality i 
(i=1,…,N) in year t (t=1,…,T) in logarithm. Xi,t is a matrix of (logs of) 
outputs and input prices. The vi,t’s are random variables independently 
distributed N(0,σv2) and independent from ui,t. The ui,t>0 represent 
technical efficiency and are independently distributed N(μi,t,σu2).  
 
To facilitate the use of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), we follow 
the arguments of Battese and Coelli (1992) and replace σv2 and σu2 with 
σ2=σv2+ σu2 and γ=σu2/σv2+ σu2. In order to allow efficiency scores from a 
SFA to vary across time, Battese and Coelli (1995) propose the use of a 
model where ui,t’s are distributed as truncations at zero of the N(μit,σu2) 
distribution, where 
 
tititi Zu ,,,          (4) 
 
and where Zi,t reflects a matrix of variables assuming to affect efficiency, δ 
is a parameter vector and the error term εi,t~N(0,σε2) is truncated from 
below by the variable truncation point –Zi,tγ. This way the inefficiency 
effects (ui,t) are expressed as an explicit function of cross-section specific 
variables (in Zi,t) and a random error. This system of a stochastic cost 
frontier and an explicit inefficiency function is estimated as a single-step 
procedure. Cost efficiency is calculated from equation (4) as EFFi=exp(-ui) 
and will take on values between 1 and infinity. The cost inefficiency of 
cross section i is thus defined as 1-EFFi. 
 
 
5. Data  
 
In our case we gathered data for all 443 municipalities in the Netherlands 
over the period of 2001-2007.2 Most data we use are drawn from 
Statistics Netherlands. The exact sources and definitions are in the 
Appendix. The data on expenditures on social assistance comes from the 
Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs.3  
 
                                                 
2 This means that any previous classifications of municipalities were regrouped into the 443 
municipalities of 2007.   
3 For the period of 2004-2007 all expenditures are available at municipal level. For 2001-
2003 municipalities working together in a joint social service with others (i.e. an Inter-
Municipal Social Service, IMS) only information is available at that IMS-level. In those cases 
we have redistributed the information at municipal levels based on each municipal share of 
households in the total of the IMS.   
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In both the DEA and SFA, we consider the municipal social assistance 
expenditures as the dependent (or output) variable.4 The inputs or 
elements of the X-matrix are identified as variables that determine the 
budgeted expenditures on social assistance. These municipal budgets are 
determined using objective variables not at the municipal’s discretion5. 
The basic idea is that these objective variables determine to a large extent 
the inevitable burden of social assistance. These variables are e.g. the 
number of single-parent households, the share of non-Western minorities 
or regional job growth. The budgets are in fact very close to the actual 
expenditures and hence expenditures are closely related to these 
‘objective’ factors that determine the budgets as well.  
 
In the SFA we will use policy strategies municipalities can uphold to limit 
social assistance dependency (Broersma et al. 2009, Edzes et al. 2009). 
We will now elaborate on this issue. Each of these strategies can be 
identified by a number of indicators. Table 3 shows which indicators can 
be identified to reflect each strategy. The most intrinsic part of the control 
strategy is reflected by the share of detected fraud cases. Checking 
whether social assistance benefit recipients are not eligible for other social 
security arrangements will raise the influx in such measures as disability 
for those without work experience (Wajong) or as social work provision 
(WSW). An activation strategy comprises subsidised employment, where 
social assistance benefit recipients have a job for which the wage costs 
are covered by a subsidy6 and non-subsidised courses, such as application 
courses. The employment strategy is reflected by the growth rate of the 
number of establishments, as result of municipal efforts to get favourable 
business conditions, and by the municipal expenses on economic affairs. 
Finally, co-operation is reflected by the extent to which municipal social 
services, who carry out social assistance, work together. The common 
period to which data are available on all these indicators is limited to the 
period 2005-2007. These strategy indicators will next be used to assess 
which strategy helps to reduce inefficiency of municipal social assistance 
payments, as in (4). This is why the SFA will be limited to 2005-2007. 
Since DEA is not about the effect of strategies, but instead on the possible 
effect of the introduction of the WSA in 2004, it is applied to the period 
2001-2007. 
                                                 
4 After 2004, social assistance budgets comprise two parts: (i) an income part providing 
income support for the social assistance recipient and (ii) a work part providing (re-) 
integration support in order to be able to (re-)enter the labour market. Before 2004 this 
distinction was not made and there was only one budget, corresponding the income part. 
Our analysis refers only to the expenditures of the income part.  
5 This so-called objective dividing-model is gradually implemented and first been applied to 
the municipalities with over 60.000 inhabitants: in 2004 the total amount of budget that was 
objectively divided lies at 40%, in 2006 the full budget was objectively divided. For the 
smaller municipalities (in 2004: less than 40.000 inhabitants and from 2006 less than 30.000 
inhabitants) the budgets were based on a historical division model. For the in between group 
(40.000-60.000 inhabitants) a mixture is chosen between an objective and a historical 
dividing model.     




Table 3. Four municipal policy strategies with respect to social  
     Assistance, 2005-2007 
Municipal strategy Short description  Indicators 
Control (C1) Threat; emphasis on fraud detection and - Wajong-inflow* 
 research whether recipients are not  - WSW-inflow** 
 eligible for other social arrangements - Fraud cases 
Activate (A) Emphasis on participation by entering - Subsidized employment 
 into subsidized jobs or other courses - Non-subsidised  courses 
Employment (E) Emphasis on job creation by stimulus of 
new firms or by high municipal   
- Growth rate of  
  establishments 
 economic affairs outlays - Expenditures on  
  economic affairs 
Co-ordination (C2) Municipalities that have a joint social  
service with other municipalities 
- IMS*** 
* Wajong refers to the disability arrangement for young persons with no employment history 
** WSW refers to employment through social work provisions for disabled persons 
*** IMS stands for Inter-Municipal Social service and is a dummy variable of 1 when a 
municipality joins such an IMS 
 
As a next step we determine for each municipality whether it lies above or 
below the national average of each of the indicators.7 This way we can 
create for each separate strategy and combination of strategies a dummy 
variable indicating a 1 for each municipality that lies above the national 
average in each of these options. Note that this means that all options are 
mutually exclusive, i.e., each municipality enters in one and only one 
strategy option. Table 4 shows the strategy options a municipality can 
have. Each option refers to (combinations of) strategies for which each 
municipality has an above national average score in 2005-2007. 
 
Table 4. Options of policy strategies and combinations 
No. Strategies Municipalities 
in 2005-2007 
No. Strategies Municipalities 
in 2005-2007 
1 None 711 10 A - C2 38 
2 Control (C1) 69 11 E - C2 17 
3 Activate (A) 119 12 C1- A - E 7 
4 Employment (E) 69 13 C1- A -C2 9 
5 Co-ordination (C2) 201 14 C1- E -C2 2 
6 C1- A 28 15 A - E -C2 5 
7 C1- E 22 16 C1- A –E - C2 0 
8 C1- C2 16 17 All 2 combinations 137 
9 A – E 19 18 All 3 combinations 23 
 
                                                 
7 Of course this implies that each indicator is scaled to make it comparable across 
municipalities. Wajong- and WSW-inflow are scaled with the total municipal population 
between 15-64 years of age. Fraud cases are related to social assistance recipients. 
Subsidies employment and other, non-subsidised, activation courses are also scaled with the 
social assistance recipients. Annual growth of establishment is in percentages and Economic 
Affairs outlays are relative to the entire population. IMS is already a dummy variable. 
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Table 4 shows that in the period 2005-2007 each municipality will enter in 
one of the strategy options numbered 1 through 16. The municipalities in 
that period add up to a total of 1329, which means that each year all 443 
municipalities are covered. Note that most municipalities have no focus on 
any of the strategies, i.e. their value on each the indicators for the policy 
strategies is below average. Note also that only a few municipalities focus 
on three strategies simultaneously and no one focuses on all four options. 
Since particularly the option of ensuing three strategies is very thin 
among municipalities, we have also looked at the combination of all 
strategies with three options, as well as the combination of all strategies 
with two options. That way the number of municipalities gets more in line 
with those ensuing one option in 2005-2007. 
 
 
6. Empirical efficiency measures 
 
This section shows the efficiency measures we found when applying DEA 
and SFA. DEA has been applied to municipal expenses on social assistance 
during the 2001-2007 period. SFA is conducted for the period 2005-2007 
assuming the policy strategies of table 4 affect efficiency. 
 
DEA is a deterministic and non-parametric analytical approach where 
linear programming determines the efficiency. We apply the DEA-program 
of Coelli (1996a), where output is municipal social assistance expenditures 
and the inputs comprise 8 inputs, based on the demographic and socio-
economic variables that determine the municipal social assistance budget: 
(i) household with a low income, (ii) single parent households, (iii) non-
Western minorities, (iv) inhabitants with an unemployment insurance 
benefit, (v) inhabitants with a low education, (vi) vacancy-unemployment 
ratio of the NUTS-3 region the municipality is in, (vii) number of municipal 
jobs and (viii) address density, as urbanisation measure. 
 
Figure 3 gives the average annual efficiency of municipal social assistance 
expenses between 2001 and 2007, based on the above DEA setting. 
Clearly the pattern of the efficiency over time shows a break in 2004. We 
also did the same analysis using additional inputs and using fewer inputs, 
but apart from a slight change in the average efficiency level, the pattern 
over time, a break in 2004, remained the same. This provides evidence in 
favour of the premise that introduction of the WSA has raised efficiency 
with which municipalities carry out the social assistance. Efficiency rose 
form 91% in the period 2001-2003 to 95% in the period 2004-2007, or 
4%-points between 2003 and 2004.8 Efficiency of social assistance 
expenses is on average already quite high in The Netherlands. Also note 
the downward trend in efficiency after 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
8 The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB 2006) finds that the introduction 
of the WSA led to a decline in the number of benefit recipients of 8000 cases. Given a social 
assistance recipient costs on average € 13,000 per year (table 1), a loss of 8000 cases 
means a decline of almost 3% in social assistance costs. 
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Figure 3. Average municipal efficiency of social assistance  
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We will next focus on the outcome of the SFA for the period 2005-2007 
and assess if certain policy strategies can be connected to the falling 
efficiency pattern during that period. As a first step we specify our cost 
frontier model. This comprises a cost model, representing the X-variables 
of equation (3) and the strategy variables of equation (4), representing 
cost inefficiency. This model is specified as9. 
 
          tiortipargletiinclowtti POPHHHHSAC ,,min3.,sin2,,1,0, loglogloglog   
        titiedulowtiinsurunem UVPOPPOP ,6,,5,,4 logloglog    (5) 







10,7,,,8,7 loglog   
 
   
 
where SACi,t are the social assistance expenses of municipality i in period 
t. The βo represents period fixed effects, the other β’s are parameters.10 
HH represents households with specific characteristics (low income or 
single parent), POP refers to number of inhabitants with certain 
characteristics (non-Western minority, on unemployment insurance 
benefit or low educated). V/U refers to the vacancy-unemployment ratio 
of the NUTS3-level the municipality is in as measure of labour market 
tightness, A/S is the number of addresses (A) per km2 municipal surface 
(S), which serves as measure of urbanisation. Jobs represents the number 
of jobs of employees working in the municipality and finally D refers to a 
                                                 
9 The model specification in (3) represents the variables of the simplified model. We adopt a 
modelling strategy of moving from general to specific. The general models contains 
additional variables that could validly be deleted from our model. The estimation results of 
this general model are available upon request. 
10 Cross-section fixed effects were not considered. Instead we focus on the effects that 
particular groupings of municipalities might have, linked to regional location and size. 
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number of control dummy variables reflecting municipal characteristics, 
viz. the NUTS1-region it is in and the size class it belongs to.11 
 
The error process in (5) is represented by ei,t, which in the setting of a 
cost frontier becomes ei,t=vi,t+ui,t. Like in (1), the vi,t’s are iid random 
variables following a N(0,σv2) distribution and the ui,t>0 are iid distributed 
N(μi,t,σu2). The ui,t, represent the efficiency process and are assumed to 
depend on policy strategies municipalities have, is represented as 
 
            (6)






,0,   


where Dpolicy-strat.j reflects the various municipal policy options of table 4. 
Note that the current specification of (6) includes all possible options for 
strategies or combinations thereof, as in table 4. We already argued that 
only very few municipalities have focused on a combination of 2 and 3 
different strategies, so the most natural solution to this is to add all 2- and 
3-combinations into one. The choice of variables entering the cost frontier 
model will be part of a sensitivity analysis of our model specification and 
subsequent efficiency measures. The efficiency pattern we found with the 
SFA for the period 2005-2007 appears to be quite stable when changing 
the explanatory and policy variables of the model. Another reassuring 
thought is that the efficiency pattern we found with SFA for 2005-2007 is 
very similar to downward trend found with DEA for those years. 
 
The cost frontier model presented in table 5, shows that period specific 
effects are not significantly different from zero and could hence validly be 
omitted from the model. We find all the X-variables in (3) to be highly 
significant. From the inefficiency part of the model, we find mixed results. 
The strongest negative effect on inefficiency, i.e. the largest positive effect 
on efficiency, is exerted by a policy strategy of activating social assistance 
recipients. On the other hand, some combinations of policy strategies 
have a worsening effect on efficiency, notably combinations of control and 
employment and of control, activation and co-ordination. However, as 
argued these combinations are best taken together and in that case we 
only find that combinations of two strategies have a positive effect on 
inefficiency (i.e. a negative effect on efficiency). And when all possible 
combinations of strategies are considered, only a weak effect remains. 
 
Figure 4 shows the average municipal efficiency score for the years 2005-
2007, based on the estimations in the final column of table 5. Clearly the 
downward trend from figure 3 for the period after 2004 is corroborated. 
The overall efficiency level, of roughly 95%, is however very high. In fact 
the non-discretional X-variables in the frontier models of table 5 already 
explain a lot of the variation in social assistance costs.12 
                                                 
11 Four size classes are distinguished: (i) more than 100.000 inhabitants, (ii) 50.000-100.000 
inhabitants, (iii) 20.000-50.000 inhabitants and (iv) less than 20.000 inhabitants. 
12 A simple regression of social assistance costs on the X-variables, without the policy 
strategies, had an adjusted R2 of 096. 
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Table 5. Estimation results of social assistance cost frontier model,  
   2005-2007 
     
Fixed effects (period) Yes No No No 
Constant 9.019*** 9.099*** 9.138*** 9.135
*** 
Log(HH_low income) 0.713*** 0.721*** 0.723*** 0.723
*** 
Log(HH_single parent) 0.590*** 0.607*** 0.605*** 0.605
*** 
Log(POP_minority) 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.153
*** 
Log(POP_unempl. insurance) 0.189*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 
Log(POP_low edu.) -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.127*** 
Log(Vacancy/Unemployment) -0.192*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.171*** 
Log(Jobs) -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.223*** -0.223*** 
Log(Addresses/km2) 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 
NORTH 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.187
*** 
WEST 0.163*** -0.168*** -0.175*** -0.175
*** 
SIZE >100k -0.376*** -0.382*** -0.370*** -0.370
*** 
SIZE 50-100k -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.181*** -0.184
*** 
SIZE 20-50k -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.207*** -0.207
*** 
     
Inefficiency model     
No specific strategy 0.010 0.001 0.021 0.022 
C1 0.104* 0.110** 0.094* 0.094
* 
A -0.212* -0.274*** -0.298*** -0.316
*** 
E -0.072 0.022 -0.038 -0.029 
C2 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.026 
C1-A 0.110 0.122*   
C1-E 0.169** 0.180**   
C1-C2 0.093 0.113   
A-E 0.037 0.050   
A-C2 -0.067 0.018   
E-C2 -0.258 -0.089   
C1-A-E 0.117 0.133   
C1-A-C2 0.219** 0.238**   
C1-E-C2 0.146 0.174   
A-E-C2 0.109 0.120   
All combinations of 2 strategies   0.153**  
All combinations of 3 strategies   0.060  
All possible combinations    0.073* 
     
σ2  0.057** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
γ 0.028 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
     
Log-likelihood 294.7 551.1 44.44 42.53 
Number of observations 1329 1329 1329 1329 
Number of cross-sections 443 443 443 443 
Number of time periods 3 3 3 3 
* significance at 10% 
** significance at 5% 
*** significance at 1% 






Figure 4. Average municipal efficiency of social assistance  








7. Developments in cost efficiency 
 
Three conclusions can be drawn from our DEA and SFA. First, the average 
efficiency levels of social assistance costs in The Netherlands are very 
high. Second, introduction of the WSA in 2004 raised cost efficiency. 
Third, the downward trend in efficiency after 2004 can be related to 
different policy strategies municipalities adopt. Table 6 gives a review of 
the efficiency effects of the various policy strategies we have 
distinguished. 
 
Table 6. Efficiency by type of policy strategy, 2005-2007 
Strategy mean s.d. range Strategy mean s.d. range 
None 0.963 0.003 0.970-0.956 A - C2 0.915 0.005 0.924-0.903 
Control (C1) 0.877 0.005 0.896-0.869 E - C2 0.916 0.006 0.925-0.902 
Activate (A) 0.997 0.002 1.000-0.996 C1- A - E 0.811 0.005 0.815-0.803 
Employment (E) 0.978 0.001 0.981-0.976 C1- A -C2 0.808 0.004 0.815-0.803 
Co-ordination (C2) 0.944 0.004 0.957-0.930 C1- E -C2 0.810 0.007 0.815-0.805 
C1- A 0.913 0.004 0.921-0.904 A - E -C2 0.811 0.005 0.817-0.804 
C1- E 0.912 0.004 0.918-0.905 All 2 combinations 0.914 0.005 0.925-0.902 
C1- C2 0.913 0.004 0.919-0906 All 3 combinations 0.810 0.005 0.817-0.803 
A – E 0.915 0.004 0.923-0.907 All combinations 0.899 0.037 0.925-0.803 
Note: s.d. stands for standard deviation, as a measure of spread of efficiency, the range 
provides the maximum and minimum efficiencies 
 
Note that particularly the case of adopting three strategies simultaneously 
has a lower efficiency. However, we saw that only few municipalities opt 
for this. Also a combination of two strategies, irrespective of the options, 
has a lower efficiency than having no strategy. As observed from table 5 
and 6, only a strategy of activation (A) raises efficiency significantly. 
However, table 6 also shows that an employment strategy has a positive 
effect on efficiency as well. On the other hand, a focus on control between 
2005 and 2007 lowered efficiency.  
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One of the reasons for the negative effect of control as strategy on social 
assistance costs, is the fact that 2005-2007 was a period of strong job 
growth following the 2002-2003 recession. Particularly the growth in 2007 
stood out, which was marked as a year in which municipalities reached 
the so-called hard core of their stock of social assistance recipients.13 
Many recipients moved to employment and in these circumstances control 
is likely not as effective as in less favourable periods.  
 
A plausible reason for the strong positive impact of activation as policy 
strategy, is the fact that the employment inflow of social assistance 
recipients, is strongly linked to subsidised employment programmes and 
other courses that recipients were engaged in. When finding employment 
via subsidised employment or non-subsidised courses, the recipient is 
leaving the social assistance administration. So from the perspective of 
social assistance expenditures, both types are efficient. From the 
perspective of overall active labour market costs, the costs of subsidised 
employment are a mere substitute of social assistance costs.14 Only when 
subsidised employment is temporarily, it contributes to the efficiency of 
social assistance expenditures. 
 
However, this does not mean that for future developments in efficiency, 
municipalities should pursue a strategy of activation. In the period 2005-
2007, this might have raised cost efficiency, but in other periods there 
might be other strategies, or combinations thereof, that work, as the cost 
frontier will also change.  
 
Next we show the variation in efficiency changes between 2001-2004 and 
between 2004-2007, to again show the effect of the WSA. Figure 5 shows 
that municipalities with a relatively large rise (decline) in efficiency in the 
period 2001-2004 experience a fall (rise) in efficiency in the period 2004-
2007. This figure clearly also shows the rise in efficiency between 2001 
and 2004, as most municipalities are on the positive side of the X-axis. 
The negative trend after 2004 is also visible as most municipalities are 









                                                 
13 See the evaluation of the model for dividing the social assistance budgets among 
municipalities in SEO/Andersson Elffers Felix (2008). 
14 Money from the income part (from which the benefit is paid) is substituted for money from 
the work part (from which wage subsidies are paid). 
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Figure 5.  Comparing differences in municipal efficiencies,  




In the country maps in figure 6 we can see that the pattern in figure 5 has 
a geographical dimension. The regions in the Netherlands that show a 
below average in efficiency in 2001 – mainly in the north and in the south 
- have an increasing efficiency in the period of 2001-2007.  
 
Figure 6.  Comparing differences in municipal efficiencies,  




Figure 7 and 8 show the distribution of the efficiency scores from the DEA 
and SFA, respectively. Figure 7 compares the efficiency distribution of 
municipalities for 2001, 2004 and 2007. This figure shows that the 
number of municipalities operating on the cost frontier is fairly constant at 
about 30%. Moreover, these are also largely the same municipalities. 
Efficiency peaks in 2004 and falls between 2004 and 2007 on all points.  
 
Figure 7. Municipal efficiency distributions 2001, 2004 and 2007 

















































































For the period 2005-2007, we consider the efficiencies from the SFA. We 
now do find differences at both lower and higher ends of the distribution 
of efficiency for the three years we could take into account. Comparing 
2005 with 2006 and particularly 2007, shows that efficiency at the lower 
end of the distributions deteriorated. On the other hand, comparing these 
same years at the higher end yields exactly the opposite. Now, efficiency 
in both 2006 and 2007 improved compared to 2005. However, overall the 


































































































These distribution changes of figure 8 imply that municipalities do change 
places and this partly depends on their policy strategies. What has 
happened between 2005 and 2007 is that many municipalities abandoned 
the option for not pursuing a particular strategy. The number of 
municipalities with no particular strategy dropped from 272 in 2005 to 199 
in 2007. The number of municipalities with a control strategy rose from 23 
in 2005 to 30 in 2007. Something similar happened with combinations of 
strategies, rising between 2005 and 2007 from 24 to 88 municipalities. 
This caused the deterioration at the lower end of the distribution in those 
years. At the same time the number of municipalities adopting an 
activation strategy doubled from 27 in 2005 to 54 in 2007. This improved 
the higher end of the efficiency distribution. 
 
Do note however that these strategies only work for the cost frontier of 
2005-2007. In an other period there will be another cost frontier in which 
other strategies may affect efficiency positively. So adopting a strategy of 




8. Conclusions  
 
The past 15 years Dutch reforms in the legislation and administration of 
welfare and social assistance benefits shifted competence and financial 
responsibility from the national government to the local level of 
municipalities. As far as social assistance is concerned, these reforms 
culminated in the Work and Social Assistance Act (WSA) in 2004. Although 
municipalities do not have the authority to change the actual benefit level, 
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they can develop their own local or regional policies, like co-operation, 
preventing unemployment, re-integration measures, gatekeepers-roles 
and so on. The gradual budgeting of the financial means for social 
assistance from 2001 to 2004, culminating in budgeting 100% of the costs 
of social assistance and re-integration to municipalities should give them 
enough incentives to act efficiently. So, the research question is whether 
Dutch municipalities have become more efficient in managing the costs of 
social assistance dependency.  
 
In our analyses we considered two time periods and two approaches to 
determine efficiency. The periods we consider are 2001-2007 and 2005-
2007. With the first period we want to assess whether introduction of the 
WSA in 2004 made a difference in cost efficiency. With the second period 
we want to assess which type of municipal policy strategies related to 
social assistance helped to improve cost efficiency. The reason why these 
strategies will only be considered in the short sample is the fact that 
adequate indicators for municipal strategies are not available before 2005. 
The efficiency effects of these strategies are analysed using a stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA). For the long sample of 2001-2007, such strategies 
cannot be identified and hence focus is on a mere efficiency effect of the 
introduction of the WSA in 2004. For this we applied the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). From both analyses the following conclusions 
can be drawn.  
 
First, DEA shows a clear break in cost efficiency in 2004. Hence the WSA 
did improve municipal cost efficiency of social assistance. After 2004 the 
improvement slowly seems to leak away. The outcome of the DEA was 
very robust for other inputs used in the analysis. Second, SFA shows that 
municipal policy strategies do matter in improving cost efficiency of social 
assistance. We found that in the period 2005-2007 particularly a strategy 
of activating social assistance benefit recipients improved efficiency. Other 
strategies, notably control and combinations of different strategies, had a 
dampening effect on cost efficiency. In addition, we can also conclude that 
efficiency is already very high in The Netherlands with a value around 
95%. Hence, there is influence of municipal policy, as we have seen, but 
this influence is small. After all, about 95% of the social assistance 
expenditures in the period 2005-2007 are determined by the inputs, i.e., 
factors that are not directly at their discretion. This confirms our research 
of the total policy effects on the in- and outflow of social assistance 
(Broersma et al, 2009). Because of that, the margins at which efficiency 
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Data appendix – Model variables 
 
 
Name Short description Source 
Expenditures social 
assistance 2004-2007 
Total of expenditures on social assistance to persons 
< 65 years of age. all municipalities  
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Expenditures social 
assistance 2001-2003 
25% expenditures on social assistance to persons < 
65 years of age. all municipalities  
Ministry of Social Affairs 
   
Single-parent 
households 
Share of single parent households in total number of 
households 
Statistics Netherlands 
Minorities Share of minorities of non-Western descent in total 
population 
Statistics Netherlands 
Low incomes Share of households with income at the lowest 4 
deciles of the national income distribution 
Statistics Netherlands 
House value Total house value as share of total housing stock Statistics Netherlands 
Low educated Share population between 15-64 with a low 




Share of persons between 15-64 with a UI benefit Statistics Netherlands 
VU-ratio Ratio of vacancies and unemployed labour force in 
the corop-region (NUTS3) the municipality is in 
Statistics Netherlands 
Employment function Ratio of jobs and the population between 15-64 Statistics Netherlands 
Address density Number of addresses  per km2 Statistics Netherlands 
   
Fraud cases Share of fraud cases in average number of persons 
on social assistance 
Divosa and Statistics 
Netherlands 
Inflow Wajong Ratio of inflow in Wajong arrangement and 
population between 15-64 (at start of period) 
Statistics Netherlands 
Inflow WSW Ratio of inflow in WSW and population between 15-
64 (at start of period) 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Statistics 
Netherlands 
Re-integration courses Ratio of re-integration courses and population 




Ratio of subsidised re-integration courses and 
population between 15-64 
Statistics Netherlands 
Ranged of external co-
operation 
Number of external parties a municipality is co-
operating with in terms of local labour markets 
Divosa 
Ranged of internal co-
operation 
Number of internal departments a municipality is 
co-operating with in terms of local labour markets 
Divosa 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
